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DEBT, CONTROL, AND COLLUSION
D. Daniel Sokol*
ABSTRACT
Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important topic
in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on
ownership. This Article shifts the discussion from a focus on common ownership
to a focus on common control. No prior work has addressed the role of debtrelated corporate control in corporate governance and competition, but debtcontrol-based governance is a critical part of the corporate landscape. Further,
various creditors can exert control over more than one company in the same
industry without any ownership. These insights have been addressed in the
corporate finance and bankruptcy law literatures, but they have not yet
penetrated antitrust debates or policy. Applying such insights, this Article
suggests that a fundamental change in antitrust policy is necessary to police
against debt-control-based collusion.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent wave of literature claims that common ownership of portfolio firms
across an industry by institutional investors may lead to anti-competitive
behavior.1 Common ownership within the same industry by mutual funds may
create incentives for mutual funds to maximize the returns of their portfolio
through collusion rather than maximize the value of any particular company
within its portfolio.2 Such behavior, if it exists, may violate antitrust law and
harm consumers.3
Before proceeding with the organization of this Article, we begin with an
overview of basic terms and concepts. At a basic level, there is equity and debt.
Equity has various economic, managerial, and exit rights because of ownership.
Debt is a different finance tool that provides capital without any of the upsides
of ownership but for which the creditors receive payments made of principal and
interest.
Normally, an owner of a single firm wants to maximize the profit of that one
firm. This assumption may be relaxed when the same owner has a portfolio of

1
See generally Andrew Koch, Marios Panayides & Shawn Thomas, Common Ownership and
Competition in Product Markets, 139 J. FIN. ECON. 109 (2021) (finding that increased common institutional
ownership does not necessarily cause reduced competition, despite other recently published research); Yaron
Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179 (2020) (arguing that corporate directors who serve on
multiple boards within the same industry can also produce collusion); José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel
Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) (presenting support for the
anticompetitive effects hypothesis); Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors,
82 ANTITRUST L.J. 221 (2018) (arguing that portfolio managers can play anticompetitive roles); Menesh S. Patel,
Common Ownership, Institutional Investors, and Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279 (2018) (stating recent
empirical research suggests common ownership has anticompetitive effects); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen
& Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89 (2017) (citing recent work
that suggests index funds encourage anticompetitive behavior); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive
Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018) (“The legal literature has . . . focused on . . . the potential for
anticompetitive behavior that arises when institutional investors own large stakes in rival firms in oligopolistic
industries.”); Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016) (advocating for more
antitrust enforcement under § 7 of the Clayton Act); Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A
Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2017) (proposing
a policy to avoid anticompetitive effects of common ownership); Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial
Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement with Professor
Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 212 (2016) (noting recent studies suggest that common ownership produces
anticompetitive effects).
2
Cf. Azar et al., supra note 1, at 1521 (hypothesizing that institutional investors such as mutual funds
maximize the profits of their shareholders by diversifying portfolios across natural competitors, resulting in
stifled competition).
3
See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1302 (positing that a cause of action exists for consumers harmed by
anticompetitive stock acquisitions under the Clayton Act).
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multiple firms in the same industry.4 In this common ownership scenario, the
owner of a portfolio of multiple firms may want to maximize the economic value
of the entire portfolio of firms rather than any single firm, consequentially
reducing competition across these firms.5 Specifically, Owner A would normally
maximize the return of Firm 1. However, when Owner A has a portfolio that
includes Firms 1, 2, 3, and 4, and all four firms are in the same industry (such as
the airline or fast-food industry), Owner A would prefer that the portfolio of the
four forms not compete as hard, so as to maximize the joint return of all four
firms.
The same incentives for maximizing the return of a portfolio of firms may
also exist for certain types of debt, especially when equity investment is
riskier—such as when a firm is close to, or in, bankruptcy. In that scenario,
debtholders may have economic or legal control (through contractual terms) of
the managerial decision-making of their portfolio of companies.6
This Article explores these types of tensions in greater detail. It does so by
shifting the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common
control. No prior work has addressed the role of debt-related corporate control
in corporate governance and competition, yet debt-control-based governance is
a critical part of the corporate landscape.7 Further, various creditors can exert
control over more than one company in the same industry without any
ownership. These insights, though found in the corporate finance and
bankruptcy law literatures, have not penetrated antitrust scholarly debates or
policy. Applying such insights, this Article suggests that a fundamental change
in antitrust policy is necessary to police debt-control-based collusion.
The change is necessary based on a gap in the statutory structure of antitrust
merger law—a gap that exempts pure debt transactions from antitrust scrutiny.8
This gap also exists in antitrust policy and scholarship. For a field focused on
the creation of legal rules that reflect an understanding of economic effects, it is
surprising that antitrust law and economics have missed a fundamental issue that
harms consumers. Even odder is the fact that antitrust law’s current approach to
debt under the Hart-Scott Rodino Act focuses on form rather than substance
(e.g., antitrust agencies do not need to be notified about pure debt transactions
4

Id.
See id. (“This means that an investor holding equal-sized stakes in both A and B would enjoy greater
total (i.e., portfolio) profits if the two firms set prices or quantities as if they were two divisions of a monopoly
instead of as two independent firms.”).
6
See infra Part I.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part IV.A.
5
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regardless of the economic consequences of debt-based control because there is
no change in ownership),9 despite the fact that, in other areas, antitrust law
typically favors substance.10
In Part I, this Article provides an overview of the antitrust common
ownership debate. Parts II and III identify the incentives for both management
and creditor engagement in debt-control-based collusion and the mechanism by
which such anti-competitive conduct can occur. Next, in Part IV, this Article
argues that the appropriate antitrust test for mergers should be about a change of
control rather than a change of ownership, so that transactions that can change a
firm’s fundamental economic power of governance can be reviewed by antitrust
authorities. This new approach represents a paradigm shift reflecting the insights
from corporate finance and corporate governance that have not yet impacted
antitrust thinking. Finally, also in Part IV, this Article posits opportunities for
policy reform, suggesting the introduction of a voluntary notification scheme,
and for further research on debt-based collusion, focusing on the use of machine
learning. It identifies and explains the potential anti-competitive effects of
partial control and suggests an enforcement approach that is administrable
within the framework of the existing antitrust theories of harm.
I.

ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND COMMON OWNERSHIP

This Part identifies the issues involved in antitrust economics and common
ownership. First, it identifies the theory of competitive harm in common
ownership in law and economics. Second, it illustrates the current gaps in
scholarship and policy.
A. Antitrust and Common Ownership Issues
Common ownership by one or more owners across a portfolio of firms in a
given industry (as facilitated by, for example, hedge funds, mutual funds, and
private equity funds) may bring about anti-competitive effects by reducing the
competition across firms within the commonly owned portfolio.11 Normally,
9

See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof,
127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2025 (2018) (discussing the courts’ incorporation of prevailing economic expertise into
merger policy); D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust’s “Curse of Bigness” Problem, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1265 (2020)
(discussing the political and economic factors that effect change in antitrust law and policy); William E. Kovacic
& Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 43, 58 (2000)
(“No other country has adopted an antitrust statute that contains equally broad substantive provisions and relies
so heavily on a common law method of judicial interpretation to implement them.”).
11
Azar et al., supra note 1, at 1521.
10
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firms compete with each other, with a gain by one firm detracting from the
market share of its competitors.12 In the case of common ownership, an
institutional investor that has stakes in Firms A, B, and C enjoys a greater total
profit from their entire portfolio if there is coordination across the firms and,
hence, less competition.13
A common owner across firms in the same industry will want to maximize
their entire portfolio of investments rather than maximize their investment in one
particular firm in its portfolio.14 This means that a common owner will find a
way to influence the profitability and conduct of its portfolio company rivals
when they make strategic decisions in each of their portfolio firms.15 This
behavior is collusive and may harm consumers.
The existence of an antitrust common ownership problem was first
recognized in the 1980s.16 Theoretical literature continued to engage in this
debate intermittently.17 However, a series of empirical finance and law review
12

Id.
Id.
14
See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Steven C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint
Ventures, 4 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 155, 161 (1986) (“It would be in both parents’ interest for each parent (as well
as the venture) to maximize joint profits and then to redistribute the profits among the parents.”).
15
Azar et al., supra note 1, at 1521.
16
See Julio J. Rotemberg, Financial Transaction Costs and Industrial Performance 18 (Alfred P. Sloan
Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 1554-84, 1984) (noting the anti-competitive effect was “simply . . . a result of
[managers] looking out for their shareholders”); Robert J. Reynolds & Bruce R. Snapp, The Competitive Effects
of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures, 4 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 141, 142 (1986) (finding lower output and
higher prices when there is partial ownership across companies within an industry); Bresnahan & Salop, supra
note 14, at 172 (comparing the anti-competitive effects of independent joint ventures to “silent financial
interest”).
17
See Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with
Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 43, 44 (1996) (“In this paper, we review
how product market imperfections, in conjunction with portfolio diversification on the part of investors, lead to
the rejection by shareholders of value maximization as a corporate policy.”); Steven C. Salop & Daniel P.
O’Brien, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 559, 562 (2000) (identifying that partial ownership may reduce consumer welfare more than a merger of
competitors); David Gilo, Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion, 37
RAND J. ECON. 81, 82 (2006) (focusing on the coordinated competitive effects of common ownership); Alan
Kraus & Amir Rubin, Reducing Managers’ Incentives to Cannibalize: Managerial Stock Options when
Shareholders Are Diversified, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 439, 440 (2010) (“In this paper, we examine how
shareholders’ diversification affects the choice of managerial compensation when managers select the mix of
projects that a company pursues, and when a company’s cashflow is affected by other companies’ actions.”);
Azar, supra note 1, at 1521 (presenting models of competition to outline the ways in which changing market
behavior benefits a firm and its owners); Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro & Helder Vasconcelos, Measuring
Unilateral Effects in Partial Horizontal Acquisitions, 33 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 22, 22 (2014) (“This paper
proposes an empirical structural methodology to assess quantitatively the unilateral competitive effects of partial
acquisitions in a differentiated products setting, distinguishing two distinct ownership rights: financial interest
13
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articles in recent years have drawn attention anew to the issues of common
ownership and competition.18 The new learning suggests that, as more corporate
ownership is concentrated in 401(k) plans, index funds, and exchange-traded
funds, a small number of institutional investors may have the ability to control
their investment portfolio in the same industry—in a way that benefits their
entire portfolio at the expense of competition that would have benefitted
consumers.19
Contemporary theoretical and empirical antitrust scholarship suggests that a
small number of important shareholders who have the incentive not to promote
competition across the firms in their portfolio of holdings (because competition
reduces the portfolio profits of common owners) can result in reduced
competition and thus harm consumer welfare.20 Common ownership diminishes
the incentives to compete, and the diminution of these incentives makes it more
likely for shareholders to benefit from tacit collusion.21
Overall, the impact of this new empirical learning has created shockwaves
in antitrust thinking—so much so that antitrust agencies in the United States22

and corporate control.”); Samuel de Haas & Johannes Paha, Partial Cross Ownership and Collusion 3 (MAGKS,
Working Paper No. 32-2016, 2016) (“We show that minority shareholdings destabilize collusion under a wider
set of assumption [sic] than was suggested by earlier literature.”); Ángel L. López & Xavier Vives, Overlapping
Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy, 127 J. POL. ECON. 2394, 2423 (2019) (discussing results of
research showing “cooperation driven by overlapping ownership leads to less output”).
18
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19
Note that such an outcome holds even with passive investments, as even passive investors participate
in corporate governance decision-making. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking
Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 9 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2021).
20
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21
Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Common Ownership and Coordinated Effects, 83 ANTITRUST
L.J. 201, 204 (identifying mechanisms of collusion).
22
See Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Competition Pol’y & Consumer Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Today, the work of the antitrust agencies is more
important than ever.”); Andrew Finch, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at Capitol
Forum’s Fifth Annual Tech, Media & Telecom Competition Conference: Concentrating on Competition: An
Antitrust Perspective on Platforms and Industry Consolidation (Dec. 14, 2018) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/)
speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch-deliverskeynote-address-capitol (“It would be an understatement to say that antitrust is a hot topic these days . . . .”);
Noah Joshua Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at FTC Hearing #8: Competition and
Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors, and Common
Ownership
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.
ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1454690/phillips_-_ftc_hearing_8_opening_remarks_12-618.pdf (“Antitrust enforcers around the world are watching [the antitrust debate’s] development . . . .”).
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and globally have begun to seriously address the issue.23 This includes recently
proposed changes to U.S. merger filing requirements.24
There have been two types of responses to common ownership competition
concerns: some have suggested a more cautious approach to these findings or
have taken issue with them more generally;25 others have embraced the common
ownership critique to suggest putting limits on common ownership capabilities
because of the competitive effects, or have suggested particular roles that
antitrust law can play.26 However, none of the original theoretical literature or
contemporary work and critiques identify common debt and collusion as a
distinct issue. Nor has the focus been on coordinated effects and tacit collusion.
This Article addresses debt-based control along with both unilateral and
coordinated effects of debt-based collusion.
Courts and antitrust agencies construe a singular economic goal for antitrust
law.27 However, the economic approach is not static. Rather, antitrust law
evolves with advances in economics.28 As the Supreme Court stated in Kimble
v. Marvel, “We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as
economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that
misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”29 For this reason, antitrust
doctrine has shifted in the past forty years from a formalistic, per se illegality
standard to a more flexible rule of reason that focuses on the economic effects
of a particular behavior.30

23
See OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFS. COMPETITION COMM., COMMON OWNERSHIP BY
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION 5 (2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/
COMP(2017)10/en/pdf (stating the importance of research on the likely effects of common ownership on
competition).
24
E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and DOJ Seek Comments on Proposed Amendments to
HSR Rules and Advanced Notice of Proposed HSR Rulemaking (Sept. 21, 2020).
25
See Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know
Less than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 730 (2017) (“[B]oth researchers and policy authorities are getting
well ahead of themselves in calling for and implementing policy changes based on this research.”); Bebchuk et
al., supra note 1, at 108–09 (stating recent work suggests that index funds encourage anticompetitive behavior).
26
See supra note 1.
27
See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic
Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 473 (2012) (“The goal of antitrust, as understood by economic analysis,
involves a choice of either total welfare or consumer welfare.”).
28
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 B.U. L. Rev. 489, 544 (2021)
(discussing the use of economic analysis in case law).
29
Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 461 (2015).
30
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (“[W]e do make clear that
departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . .
formalistic line drawing.”).
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Where antitrust policy has been relatively effective in marrying economic
analysis to administrability concerns has been in traditional industrial
organization economics, which examines competition across firms.31
Paradoxically, antitrust policy, with its emphasis on economic analysis, is stuck
in a much earlier era of thought with regard to financial economics and
incentives within firms.32 As a result, antitrust policy has created inflexible,
formalistic rules solely addressing control via stock ownership instead of
focusing on the economic effects of control across both debt and equity, and
incentives within the firm with regard to issues of corporate control.33 In so
doing, antitrust policy has come to be at odds with economic analysis.34
The traditional view in antitrust economics is that debt weakens, rather than
strengthens, collusion because large amounts of firm debt make deviation from
a collusive agreement more attractive, since shareholders benefit from increased
profits in the deviation period while debt lenders bear the cost of a defection
because an individual firm may be less likely to be able to pay back its debt
without the collusion.35 Further, price wars are often characterized as a
punishment mechanism within the collusion literature.36 In a classic article,
Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes provide two reasons for the claim that a
financially marginal firm may serve to destabilize collusive behavior:
insufficient punishment and predatory behavior.37 They theorize that a firm that
is likely to exit the market because it is financially weak will have a shorter time
horizon compared to other firms. Because of this shorter time horizon, such firm
cannot be punished for defection from collusion in the same way as financially
strong firms.38 As a result, firms that are on a stronger financial footing prefer to
31

Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 10; Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 10.
Barak Orbach, D&O Liability for Antitrust Violations, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 527, 559 (2020)
(“[A]ntitrust’s personal accountability standards still focus on direct involvement and, as such, as relatively
outdated and ineffective.”); D. Daniel Sokol & Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Antitrust Corporate Governance and
Compliance, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 586 (Roger D. Blair &
D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014) (identifying gaps between antitrust and corporate governance scholarship).
33
Like policy literature, traditional finance literature focuses largely on issues of control, with antitrust
implications addressed fleetingly. For more information, see generally GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES, MILTON
HARRIS & RENE STULZ, 2A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (2012); GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
MILTON HARRIS & RENE STULZ, 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (2012).
34
Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 510 (“Antitrust policy needs to be less categorical and more empirical
about assessing passed-on injury from monopolistic or cartel conduct.”).
35
See Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars, 31 RAND
J. ECON. 207, 221–22 (2000).
36
Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933–1939,
32 J.L. & ECON. S47, S55–56 (1989); Margaret C. Levenstein, Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A
Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry, 45 J. INDUS. ECON. 117, 133 (1997).
37
Fershtman & Pakes, supra note 35, at 221–22.
38
Id.
32
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hasten the exit of the financially weak firm that cannot be counted on as a
collusive partner, and therefore prefer to use predatory pricing to remove such a
firm.39 Vojislav Maksimovic makes a similar argument about debt leading to the
breakdown of collusion (by changing the payoff structure) as less leverage
makes cartels (firms that are colluding to price fix or limit output through some
other conduct) more stable.40
The traditional thinking on debt and competition has made its way into
antitrust legislation. The current antitrust law merger framework—a
fundamental part of antitrust thinking since the 1970s with the passage of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act of 197641—misses all
pure debt (as opposed to convertible debt) transactions.42 So do the current
proposed reforms of HSR to address common ownership.43
This Article advocates a fundamental reframing of antitrust thinking to
address this gap in debt-related enforcement—a gap that the current economic
crisis, with many companies entering into bankruptcy or into financial distress,
exacerbates. In so doing, this Article turns the thinking about debt on its head
and suggests that, under certain circumstances, debt will strengthen rather than
weaken collusion. To understand how this is possible, this Article reviews how
debt and control work. In short, one or more hedge funds, or other firms that use
debt and lend to distressed firms, or firms operating under bankruptcy
protection, can have no ownership but can still control decision-making in an
entire industry through debt in a way that weakens competition and hurts
consumers, similar to partial ownership.
The implications of operationalizing this Article’s theory of debt-related
control antitrust issues require the identification of both the incentives and
mechanisms for anti-competitive harm. As the next section will show, debtbased common ownership alters managerial incentives such that managers may
39

Id.
Vojislav Maksimovic, Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies, 19 RAND J. ECON. 389, 390 (1988)
(allowing for convertible debt). This Article assumes only pure debt rather than convertible debt, which is
reported under merger law when the firm converts the debt to equity.
41
William J. Baer, Former Dir., Bureau of Competition, Statement at the 35th Annual Corporate Counsel
Institute: Reflections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (Oct. 31, 1996)
(available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1996/10/reflections-20-years-merger-enforcement-underhart-scott-rodino-act) (“At the time of its enactment, [the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act] was described as one of the
most far-reaching changes in antitrust enforcement since the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. That prophesy
has rung true.”).
42
Antitrust agencies must be notified of convertible debt that becomes an equity stake, but that
transformation fits within the ownership-as-control paradigm.
43
See supra note 24.
40
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cause their firms to behave anti-competitively. Parts III and IV provide the
mechanisms for such collusive activity.

B. Antitrust Economics and Debt
In the equity-based common ownership world, the linkage between common
ownership and competitive harm is driven by economics models that postulate
that firm managers with equity-based common ownership maximize the
weighted portfolios of their respective firms’ shareholders.44 That specification
of managerial behavior can be justified in a variety of ways, such as through
shareholder voting.45 That is, managers have an incentive to maximize the
portfolios of their shareholders (and thus create profit linkages between the
firms) because if they do not, then the shareholders will vote the managers out.46
The incentives for collusion work differently in debt and equity because of
the differences noted in the prior section.47 At the firm level, in the typical setting
of collusion, shareholders have an incentive to have their firms engage in anticompetitive conduct, as they benefit from higher prices via collusion through
increased stock valuation due to higher revenues.48 Creditors typically lack this
incentive because they lack an equity stake. Because creditors do not have the
same influence over firm managers that shareholders typically have, their
incentive to partake in debt-based collusion is different from that specific to
managers.49 Incentive contracts may be written in such a way that managers have
lower benchmarks to make the bonus.50

44

See Azar et al., supra note 1, at 1521.
See id. at 1557.
46
Id.
47
See supra Part I.A.
48
D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 798 (2013) (“[T]here is no agency
cost for cartels because both the firm and individual cartelists benefit from cartel participation in terms of profits
and stock price increases, assuming no detection of the cartel and mere basic (legal but not strong) oversight
from the board.”).
49
See, e.g., Maksimovic, supra note 40, at 390 (identifying capital structure issues and market
competition in a repeated game); James A. Brander & Tracy R. Lewis, Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The
Limited Liability Effect, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 956, 969 (1986) (theorizing the impact of debt signaling on product
market competition).
50
For example, law school students, when faced with the different incentives of pass/fail and graded
classes, put forth varying degrees of effort. See also Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné & Martin C.
Schmalz, Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 511/2017, 2021) (“[W]hen large investors own shares in more than one firm within
the same industry, those firms may have reduced incentives to compete.”)
45
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But in some settings, creditors may have an incentive to collude with
control.51 A necessary condition of this incentive is when the capital structure of
a firm matters. Typically, this is when a firm does not have a ready market for
additional equity investment because the firm is in distress and the default risk
is high, or when a firm is in a state of bankruptcy, where the equity of interest is
subordinate to that of the creditors.52
There are several factors that make debt-based control and collusion more
likely under certain circumstances. The expected payoff of debt and equity for
all the firms in an industry almost always gets bigger with collusion, and the
variance of each firm’s value is probably also lower with collusion (when
colluding, no one is trying to dominate the industry, which is likely to reduce
the variance).53 This is more likely in industries that are in distress. In an ex ante
sense, if debt can help lead to tacit collusion, each firm involved should want to
figure out a way to make it work.54 Ex post, debtholders have a continuing
incentive to make it work.
Unlike common ownership, which focuses on the upside value of potential
collusion, common debt focuses on mitigating downside risk. The type of
situation that illustrates creditor incentives is as follows. In a distressed industry,
Creditor A lends $100 million each to four firms. The payoff for Creditor A is
$12 million in total interest ($3 million per firm), assuming all four firms pay
back their respective principals of $100 million. However, since this is a
distressed industry, it can be assumed that some of the firms are closer to
insolvency than the others and that the entire industry is financially weak. If
Firm 4 exits the market due to bankruptcy, Creditor A receives pennies on the
dollar (but for purposes of illustration, let us assume that Creditor A incurs a
total loss, receiving $0). In this scenario, Creditor A makes $9 million from its
total investment from the three other portfolio firms ($3 million per firm)—it
recoups the $300 million principal that it had lent to those three firms but loses
the $100 million that it lent to Firm 4, for a total loss of $91 million in its
investment portfolio.
In an alternative approach to this portfolio risk that promotes collusion, the
creditors want a quiet life for their entire portfolio of firms so that the firms can

51
A more sophisticated version of this scenario would involve both equity control for one firm and debt
control for the other firms in the same industry.
52
Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in 2 OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32, at 464, 465.
53
Id.
54
Id.
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pay off their loans with little risk. Creditor A decides to fix incentive contracts
so that it is easy to reach a performance benchmark for the CEOs of Firms 1
through 4. Every firm competes, but not too rigorously. Now, Creditor A will
get its entire payoff of $12 million, with almost no risk of default on the $400
million it had lent, because the firms have little incentive to compete against
each other. Adding Creditor B with a similar strategy and payoff scheme for the
same set of debtor firms helps ensure the collusive outcome.
Presumably, the distressed debt also trades below par, such that there may
be upside prospects for debtholders as the firm or colluding firms take steps to
improve firm value. Improving firm performance has a few tricky consequences
for the colluding firms. First, the value of creditors’ claims is capped insofar as
the value of the once-distressed debt can typically only appreciate to par (or
maybe slightly above, depending on interest rates, and so on).55 That may be a
big or small number, but in any event, it is more or less capped, unlike equity.
Second, as the firms’ values improve, lender control likely weakens, so that the
levers for collusion become less effective. Third, what are managers and
shareholders doing while the lenders are colluding? Presumably, managers
would like to put equity on the balance sheet so that managers get their
performance pay and do not get fired. The dynamics then suggest that debt-based
collusion may be unstable—even more unstable than traditional collusion. No
manager of a distressed firm wants the status quo because long term there are
only two viable options—bankruptcy or an out-of-court solution. Whether they
are headed for bankruptcy or an out-of-court solution, a firm’s improvement
weakens creditor control. So, at the least, any collusion may be unstable unless
incentive-based contracts can better align management incentives, discussed in
Part III.A.5.
C. Antitrust Implications
Successful collusion by creditors requires an understanding of the type of
control that matters for antitrust purposes. While it may be that creditors exercise
control over debtor corporations (as this Article illustrates below through five
different mechanisms and in greater detail in Part III), it seems that the relevant
antitrust question is whether creditors have the incentive and ability to cause
corporations to violate antitrust law. Those types of control include the ability
to (1) set the price, (2) decide whether to acquire companies, (3) reduce capital

55
On how to think about the value of distressed debt, see generally Edward I. Altman & Robert Benhenni,
The Anatomy of Distressed Debt Markets, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECONS. 21 (2019) (providing an overview of debt
related financing issues).
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expenditures, and (4) replace top management. Firms with control regularly
exercise such control through contracts even when the pricing terms are not
explicit and without exerting control for purposes of agency law. Such control
is merely understood, such as in franchising,56 maximum resale price
maintenance,57 and minimum advertising prices.58
Noting the incentives of management and creditors, the mechanism of
control requires an analysis of whether, in an environment of debt-based
common ownership, two situations occur: (1) managerial incentives are altered
such that managers have an incentive to cause their firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct, and (2) creditors have the incentive and ability to cause
corporations to behave anti-competitively.59 To explore incentives involving
debt and control in greater detail, Part II explains how debt can create such
mechanisms of control.
II. DEBT AND CONTROL
A. Overview of Debt and Control Issues
To understand debt-based control, one first needs a brief primer on the
tension between debt and equity. This tension has implications on overall
56
See Itai Ater & Oren Rigbi, Price Control and Advertising in Franchising Chains, 36 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 148, 149, 155 (2015).
57
See Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Maximum Resale Price Restraints in Franchising, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 157–59 (1996) (analyzing the Albrecht rule, which prohibits franchisors from directly
controlling pricing of franchisees to maximize the franchisor’s profits, and evaluating alternative means to
indirectly control franchisee pricing (referencing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968))).
58
See generally Ayelet Israeli, Online MAP Enforcement: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 37 MKTG.
SCI. 710 (2018) (finding that compliance rates with the minimum advertised price policy are improved when
there are customized online environments, credible monitoring, and punishments for noncompliance).
59
Antitrust history also provides some flavor to this, particularly the old “ruinous competition” cases
from the 1890s and thereafter, beginning with United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S.
290 (1897), as well as Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). In the case of the
railroads in particular, a very high percentage were in receivership at the time of the litigation, largely as a result
of overbuilding. The defense offered for price fixing was that ruinous competition would result in a large
proportion of railroad companies being driven into bankruptcy and shut down. This concern would affect
creditors as well as shareholders. Sure, the creditors would have priority over the shareholders, but if the residual
value is zero or close, everybody loses. That would give both shareholders and creditors an incentive to fix
prices. See generally George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the
Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1982) (contributing “a more detailed analysis of costs in the castiron pipe industry and to propose what may appear to be a novel explanation for the cartelization and merger”);
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 110–28 (Wash. Nat’l Home Libr.
Found. ed. 1933) (1914) (pointing out the issue of interlocking debt holdings as essential to the railroad
receiverships at the turn of the century, which allowed equity and the bondholders to roll up the unsecured
creditors).
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business strategy.60 At the most basic level, equity and debt are not always the
same. As an owner of the firm, a shareholder has equity therein and certain
financial and managerial rights as a result. On the managerial side, shareholders
can elect directors and vote their shares, among other rights. On the financial
side, equity holders reap the benefits of improvements in the financial position
of a firm, such as through growth of the value of their equity stake. A $10,000
investment in Amazon or Microsoft in 2000 is worth multiples of that today.
Thus, equity investment can capture the upside of capital appreciation.
Debt, in contrast, does not entitle one to ownership rights in a firm. The
upside of debt is limited to repayment of the principal plus payment of the
interest. Whether a firm grows 1% or 1,000% is irrelevant for purposes of
repayment of debt. Thus, the difference in incentives between debt and equity
may be significant.61
Equity holders may prefer riskier projects because the potential payoff is
higher. As the value of shares will increase with bigger payoffs, the upside to
equity is larger. Similarly, losses due to limited liability are restricted to the
amount invested in the firm. These create different incentives for creditors and
equity holders. As Randall Kroszner and Philip Strahan explain, “Senior
creditors . . . prefer that the firm undertake actions that maximize the probability
of their repayment rather than maximize the expected return to shareholders.”62
This runs counter to the incentive of equity holders to maximize the shareholder
value.
There are a number of distinct areas of potential conflict between debt and
equity: dividend policy, equity issues and share repurchases, anti-takeover
provisions, executive compensation, and restructuring activities.63 Aneel
Keswani, Ahn Tran, and Paolo Volpin found that the more troubled a firm is,
the more misalignment will exist between the interests of the debtholders and
shareholders—such misalignment is “magnified close to financial distress.”64
Related to this, Adam Badawi identified “evidence of increased restrictiveness
60
See Bo Becker & Per Strömberg, Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts, 25 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1931, 1931–32 (2012).
61
See generally Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities
and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1027 (1994) (analyzing incentives for managers,
shareholders, and debt holders and finding that the optimal financial structure of a firm accounts for those
incentive differences to combat the moral hazard issue).
62
Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and
Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 415, 420 (2001).
63
Aneel Keswani, Anh Tran & Paolo Volpin, Institutional Debtholder Governance, 56 J. FIN.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 2103, 2104 (2021).
64
Id. at 2105.
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in the bond contracts entered into by Delaware firms relative to non-Delaware
firms” and observed that “the results are particularly strong for those borrowers
who are in poor financial health.”65 These different incentives suggest that
creditors prefer stability.
This primer on debt versus equity sets the stage for a discussion of debt and
control in the context of collusion. Because it is very difficult to observe
collusion across firms, it is important to identify mechanisms through which
incentives to collude, which would make collusion more likely to occur, can be
identified. Understanding how debt interacts with issues of control allows one
to identify such mechanisms. To do this, it is important to provide a more general
overview of the debt ecosystem.
In the academic and policy conversations, the exclusive emphasis on equity
and ownership in antitrust matters is surprising, as debt plays a critical role in
the economy. In terms of the total capital, the global bond market’s value was
over $100 trillion in 2017, whereas the global equity market value was $85
trillion.66
In the world of debt, the financial goal of a lender in providing capital to a
potential debt-holding firm is to ensure that there is a return on investment based
on the payment of the principal and interest.67 To ensure repayment, creditors

65

Adam B. Badawi, Debt Contract Terms and Creditor Control, 4 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 1, 4 (2019).
George S. Dallas, The Role of the Creditor in Corporate Governance and Investor Stewardship, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 9, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/09/the-role-of-thecreditor-in-corporate-governance-and-investor-stewardship/.
67
Richard Carrizosa & Stephen G. Ryan, Borrower Private Information Covenants and Loan Contract
Monitoring, 64 J. ACCT. & ECON. 313, 316 (2017) (“Lenders’ primary goal is to ensure that they earn adequate
returns on their loans.”).
66
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exert control on their borrowers through contracts.68 This concept of control
through debt contracts has been well studied in law69 and economics.70

68
See Colleen Honigsberg, Sharon Katz & Gil Sadka, State Contract Law and Debt Contracts, 57 J.L. &
ECON. 1031, 1033 (2014) (finding there is a market for contracts due to factors that make certain states’ laws
more favorable to contract under).
69
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 28–32, 123–27 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2014) (illustrating the ways that a lender can become a principal or partner of the borrowing firm by
exercising certain degrees of control); Yesha Yadav, The Case for a Market in Debt Governance, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 771, 774–77 (2014) (proposing that lenders should exercise control in corporate governance to optimize
debt governance and motivate good behavior); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung
Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 117 (2009) (discussing the
importance of lender influence on corporate governance); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private
Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211–13 (2006) (examining
the role of creditors in corporate governance decisions); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of
Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1077–78, 1080–81 (1995) (describing an
interactive system of corporate governance that helps ensure lenders work toward the common goals of all
shareholders); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance
and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 728–35 (2008) (discussing commons forms of debt decoupling and
their implications); Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 538–39 (2009) (finding that “[c]reditors dictate the dynamics of the reorganization
process” through covenants or court motions); Robert K. Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1749, 1752–53, 1755 (2018) (assessing the allocation of control rights and how creditors exercise
control).
70
See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in
Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356, 365–66, 386 (1990); Michael
R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657,
1658 (2009); Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 61, at 1049–50; Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An
Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 486–90 (1992); Sudheer
Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, 63 J. FIN.
2085, 2085–88 (2008); Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1715 (2012); Antonio Falato & Nellie Liang, Do
Creditor Rights Increase Employment Risk? Evidence from Loan Covenants, 71 J. FIN. 2545, 2549 (2016); see
also Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343, 344–45, 359 (2007)
(analyzing the costs and benefits of hedge funds exercising control through holding more votes than economic
ownership or holding undisclosed economic ownership without votes but with the ability to acquire such votes
if needed); David J. Denis & Jing Wang, Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control Rights, 113 J.
FIN. ECON. 348, 349 (2014) (arguing that creditors have strong control rights as evidenced by the renegotiation
of debt covenants regardless of default); Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira & Beatriz Mariano, Creditor
Control Rights and Board Independence, 73 J. FIN. 2385, 2386–87 (2018) (finding that credit agreements shape
a firm’s board composition, governance, and policies, particularly after a covenant violation, where there is a
twenty-four percent increase in independent directors on corporate boards, most of whom have ties to creditors);
Michael R. Roberts, The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting,
116 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 62–63, 70–71, 77 (2015) (“[F]requent renegotiation is an integral part of bank lending.
The role of renegotiation is as an ex post remedy to ex ante restrictive contracts that grant lenders strong control
rights when confronted with an informational disadvantage.”); Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton,
Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. ECON.
225, 232–33, 256–57 (1994) (analyzing the factors leading to the appointment of former bank directors and
corporate directors to Japanese corporations and finding that poor financial performance was the main catalyst).
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By agreeing to debt contracts and the covenants therein, firms trade off
increased monitoring and control for access to credit.71 Access to financial and
operational information allows creditors to better understand when borrowers
may run into trouble complying with the terms of the covenants or actually
violate such terms.72 Similarly, covenants reduce moral hazards through
improved monitoring.73
There are different types of covenants that can lead to situations of debt
control, including “reducing capital expenditures, debt issuing, acquisition
spending, and shareholder payouts; demanding better reporting and liquidity
management; [and] pushing for the replacement of top executives.”74 According
to George Triantis and Ronald Daniels, such covenants “serve as trip wires for
the lender’s right to accelerate and enforce or to intervene in the borrower’s
decisions.”75 A violation of the terms of a debt covenant allows for a direct
transfer of control from the equity holder to the debtholder through an
adjustment to the existing debt covenants or through the exertion of influence
on the firm’s decision making.76
This potential acceleration changes creditors’ traditional bargaining leverage
with the managers of a debtor firm.77 This change in bargaining leverage leads
to the renegotiation of the debt contract, which gives debtholders additional
control over the firm’s policy.78 Even when there is no breach of a debt contract
71
See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD.
393, 394 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 36–37 (1985);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
72
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 70, at 1658–60 (finding that most renegotiations do not terminate the
debt contract).
73
See Valeri V. Nikolaev, Scope for Renegotiation in Private Debt Contracts, 65 J. ACCT. & ECON. 270,
272, 274 (2018); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1216–36 (discussing contract provisions that reduce
uncertainty and provide incentives to businesses to perform in the best interest of all parties invested by giving
a creditor significant control rights, particularly when a business is at risk of default).
74
Yuqi Gu, Connie X. Mao & Xuan Tian, Banks’ Interventions and Firms’ Innovation: Evidence from
Debt Covenant Violations, 60 J.L. & ECON. 637, 638 (2017).
75
Triantis & Daniels, supra note 69, at 1093–94.
76
See Ferreira et al., supra note 70, at 2385–86; Paul Asquith, Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber,
Performance Pricing in Bank Debt Contracts, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 101, 102 (2005); Tung, supra note 69, at
119 (“It turns out, however, that bank creditors and other private lenders often enjoy significant oversight and
influence over managerial decisions.”); Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as
Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113, 1114–15 (1995).
77
See Falato & Liang, supra note 70; Roberts & Sufi, supra note 70, at 1658, 1664–66; Chava & Roberts,
supra note 70, at 2086; Roberts, supra note 70, at 62–63. Debt renegotiation may occur even without a breach.
See Denis & Wang, supra note 70.
78
See Ferreira et al., supra note 70, at 2385–86; Roberts & Sufi, supra note 70, at 1666 (“Although the
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through default, such a contract may be renegotiated, as violations rarely lead to
default.79 Instead, when default occurs, there is the option of renegotiation.80 As
such, debtholders have control over debtor firms, even without ownership and
even without a contract violation.81
Creditors may also influence who joins the board of a firm. In their recent
work, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira, and Beatriz Mariano found that the
number of independent directors on a board increases twenty-four percent
following a debt contract violation, and that most of these new directors have
ties to the creditors.82
Financial payoff structures work differently for debt than for equity, and this
tension between debt and equity becomes clearer when firms are in distress.83
This may have implications for antitrust. The strategic use of debt-based control
by certain types of creditors that may have a debt contract with more than one
company in one industry may allow such creditors to have effective control of
the debtor firms without formal ownership and may give them strong incentives
to engage in enough competition so that the firms’ debt, plus interest, can be
repaid, but not so much to maximize profit as competition across firms will
threaten their returns. As the next section of this Article suggests, however, a
particular type of debtholder is more likely to be able to have both the means
and the motivation to use debt-based control to tacitly collude with other
debtholders. As Part IV.A explains, there is no antitrust tool at present that can
effectively deal with this scenario.

allocation of control rights is an important aspect of these models, creditor ‘control’ does not necessarily entail
creditors literally replacing managers as decision-makers.”); Chava & Roberts, supra note 70, at 2086; Albert
Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 51, 55, 57 (2013); Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant
Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT. RSCH. 1091, 1092–93 (2002).
79
See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting,
59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 479 (1992) (analyzing incomplete contracts and how control rights can be allocated
to account for this uncertainty and future renegotiation).
80
Denis & Wang, supra note 70, at 349.
81
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1227 (“The lending agreement contains many affirmative
and negative covenants that give the lender de facto control over every aspect of the business. . . . Decisions
normally reserved for directors and stockholders—such as whether to sell a division, change the business plan,
or replace the managers—require the lender’s explicit blessing.”); Denis & Wang, supra note 70 (identifying
covenant modification in fifty-three percent of debt contracts); Roberts, supra note 70, at 62 (identifying more
than seventy-five percent of covenant breaches leading to debt contract renegotiation); Michael R. Roberts &
Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON.
159, 160 (2009) (finding over ninety percent of credit agreements studied are renegotiated).
82
Ferreira et al., supra note 70, at 2386–87.
83
See Kroszner & Strahan, supra note 62, at 416 (finding that another such situation of different debt
versus equity tensions in corporate governance exists when firms face risky investment decisions).
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B. Hedge Funds, Private Equity, and Distressed Debt Funds
The prior section identified the ability of debtholders to exercise control over
their portfolio companies through contracts. Such control is more intense and
pervasive than equity institutional investors who maintain only partial
ownership of their portfolio firms because the debt control mechanisms are more
direct. Two types of firms are more likely to have a potential anti-competitive
impact due to common debtholder control issues: distressed firms and firms in
bankruptcy.
Given this backdrop, not all debt contracts may lead to potential anticompetitive harm through tacit collusion. Debt markets are usually procompetitive. For example, hedge funds add value to the financial system through
increased liquidity, and significant attempts to stymie them will cause consumer
welfare loss.84 Hedge funds tend to hold financial leverage in companies that are
highly concentrated and illiquid.85
Similarly, private equity has several efficiency-enhancing benefits. These
include the following:
(1) [B]etter governance and a greater willingness to take risks, (2) the
ability to focus on long-term issues and a more stable shareholder base,
(3) the ability to attract better management talent, (4) creating a sense
of urgency, (5) better use of leverage, (6) avoiding the costs imposed
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and (7) avoiding shareholder
suits.86

Debt also plays an outsized role relative to equity in such firms where anticompetitive tacit collusion may be more likely. The incentive for tacit collusion
to benefit the entire portfolio of funds may be significant in such firms where
too much competition could lead to the bankruptcy of more firms, which would
hurt the returns of the overall portfolio.

84
Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Speech: Hedge
Funds and Derivatives and Their Implications for the Financial System (Sept. 15, 2006) (available at
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060914.html) (“In most circumstances, increased trading
and participation contributes to market liquidity and makes markets less volatile. The ultimate benefit should be
lower risks for all market participants.”).
85
Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Hedge Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. FIN. 513, 516 (2012) (finding that
this provides hedge funds with increased bargaining leverage in negotiations with distressed firms).
86
Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selection and Liability Help Public Companies
Gain Some of Private Equity’s Advantages?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2009); see also Ronald W. Masulis
& Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on
Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 220–21 (2009) (describing the value creation of private equity).

SOKOL_2.15.22

2022]

2/24/2022 2:20 PM

DEBT, CONTROL, & COLLUSION

715

In terms of ability to engage in anti-competitive conduct, distressed debt
investors are involved in the governance of their targeted firms,87 but the mere
possibility of such conduct does not mean that much of the conduct of distressed
firms is anything but benign. Focusing on bankrupt firms, Wei Jiang, Kai Li,
and Wei Wang examined the impact of hedge funds holding debt and equity on
Chapter 11 outcomes.88 They found that hedge funds were involved in nearly
ninety percent of all the bankruptcy proceedings that had taken place prior to
their study.89 They also discovered that hedge fund involvement in bankruptcy
increases the likelihood of successful bankruptcy reorganization and that such
involvement leads to efficiency gains rather than value extraction.90 The
explanation for this finding is that hedge funds solve the informational problem
associated with agency costs. The funds paint a better picture of the debtor firm’s
financial situation, and such information can be used to improve the
management of the firm.91 This lender behavior is especially true for commercial
lenders and borrowers.92
In the case of distressed debt investors, Edith Hotchkiss and Robert
Mooradian observed that “[d]ebtholders also have a strong bargaining position
from which to influence the terms of the restructuring since their approval is
required for reorganization.”93 They also found that distressed debt funds often
hold at least one-third of the outstanding amount of debt, which gives them
influence with regard to the particular terms of the restructuring.94
While the aforementioned articles relate debt fund activity to outcomes, the
issue of collusion generally has not been empirically examined by corporate
finance scholars. It is true that often an entire industry is distressed, so there will
clearly be gains if the firms in the industry collude, even tacitly. The empirical
research on hedge funds suggests the existence of coordination that may make
collusion more likely, such as communication in connection with pre-packaged
87
Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed
Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402–03 (1997) (finding that 27.8% of the sample debtholder firms join the board
of portfolio companies).
88
Jiang et al., supra note 85, at 513–14.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 556.
91
See Hotchkiss & Mooradian, supra note 87, at 403.
92
See Michael Minnis & Andrew Sutherland, Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms:
Evidence from Small Commercial Loans, 55 J. ACCT. RSCH. 197, 198, 228 (2017). See generally Robert M.
Bushman, Abbie J. Smith & Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private
Information by Loan Syndicate Participants, 48 J. ACCT. RSCH. 921, 922 (2010) (finding that lenders’ early
access to information leads to faster price discovery when institutional lenders are involved in syndicated loans).
93
Hotchkiss & Mooradian, supra note 87, at 402.
94
Id.
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restructurings or bankruptcy proceedings.95 This Article discusses the
mechanism of collusion occurrence suggested by previous empirical studies on
debt contracting.
C. Fiduciary Duties
Fiduciary duties are a bedrock of corporate governance.96 Directors have two
primary fiduciary duties to promote the interests of shareholders: the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty.97 A critique of common ownership in antitrust
literature is that members of boards of directors appointed by mutual funds based
on ownership would violate their fiduciary duties if they pursued a strategy that
did not maximize the interest of the shareholders.98 Fiduciary duties generally
limit the potential for anti-competitive conduct for directors and managers.99
From a fiduciary duty standpoint, for as long as a corporation is solvent, the
fiduciary duties of the directors pertain only to the shareholders.100 In deciding
Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., the
Delaware Court of Chancery tried to shift fiduciary protection from equity
holders to debtholders.101 This view was overturned in North American Catholic
Education Programming Foundation v. Gheewalla.102 In Gheewalla, the
95
See generally Jongha Lim, The Role of Activist Hedge Funds in Financially Distressed Firms, 50 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1321, 1322–23, 1344–45 (2015) (explaining the restructuring process can be
hindered when multiple groups of activist hedge funds are present). This coordination on its own is not anticompetitive. See CompuCredit Holdings Corp. v. Akanthos Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 661 F.3d 1312, 1312–13, 1315
(11th Cir. 2011).
96
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 580–82 (2003) (discussing shareholder wealth maximization effects on
boards of directors’ corporate governance); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 837–39 (2005) (discussing powers for the shareholder that would ensure boards of
directors’ prioritization of shareholder interest throughout management).
97
Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 803, 804 (2019).
98
C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership, 129 YALE
L.J. 1392, 1395 (2020).
99
See generally Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in
Corporate Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 803, 804 (2019) (“The duty of care requires directors and officers to
exercise the level of care that a prudent person would use under similar circumstances.”).
100
See Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2011).
101
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’n Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“[T]he . . . board . . . had an obligation to the community of interest
that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the
corporation’s long-term wealth creating capacity.”).
102
N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (“[T]he
creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right, as a matter
of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation’s directors.”).
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Delaware Supreme Court ruled that rights for creditors against directors “would
create a conflict between those directors’ duty to maximize the value of the
insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it, and the
newly recognized direct fiduciary duty to individual creditors.”103 More
recently, in Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin,104 the Delaware
Chancery Court clarified that while there is no discreet duty owed to creditors
per se, there is a duty owed to the insolvent firm for the benefit of all of its
residual claimants, which, upon insolvency, includes the claims of the
creditors.105
Given that creditors do not have such fiduciary duties owed to them except
in bankruptcy and insolvency settings, potential tacit collusion by creditors is
not likely to be realized under either antitrust or corporate law. This fiduciary
duty gap creates opportunities for creditors in distressed debt, private equity, or
hedge funds who have extended credit to multiple firms in the same industry not
to maximize the shareholder values of such firms, but instead to maximize the
value of their entire portfolio of investments before the debtor firm is formally
declared bankrupt.
The limits to the fiduciary duties owed to creditors under corporate law
suggest that there is a potential gap under such law with regard to preventing
debt-based tacit collusion. This gap may be significant and may provide motive
for collusion.

103

Id. at 103.
115 A.3d 535 (Del. Ch. 2015).
105
Id. at 546–47. This does not preclude all debt-related fiduciary duties, such as derivative shareholder
suits. Id. Derivative suits are an important part of corporate governance. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation
Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 296, 308–09 (2010) (explaining voicebased reforms are becoming more popular in corporate governance); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven
Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994) (“Shareholder
suits are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers.”); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1991) (explaining the shareholder’s
derivative suit is a corporate law device for controlling conflicts between managers and shareholders); Robert
B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1747, 1749–50 (2004) (predicting derivative suits will continue to play an important role in corporate
governance). Even though the law in this area has been narrowed specifically to exclude the period of a firm
being distressed, in reality, some amount of control may exist for purposes of governance long before
bankruptcy, even for distressed firms. Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor
Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2011) (noting “real control shifts away from directors and
shareholders to creditors” when a firm is in “the ‘zone of distress,’” or the period during which a company falls
from solvency to bankruptcy); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for
Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169, 170 (2018) (“In
insolvency, the fiduciary duty of loyalty expands to contemplate creditors as well as shareholders . . . .”).
104
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III. ANTITRUST AND DEBT
Since the case law developments in the mid-2000s, antitrust law has played
a smaller role in enforcement in regulated financial markets.106 Yet, antitrust law
can and should play an important role in monitoring the behavior of creditors
when debt-control-based collusion may occur. Financial markets in distressed
debt and bankruptcy, and where creditors exercise partial control, are where
antitrust law and policy can play their traditional role of policing against anticompetitive behavior.
While legal scholarship has determined that debt contracting may improve
consumer welfare,107 this work does not focus on antitrust implications of debt
contracts as a mechanism for control to breach consumer welfare. From the
perspective of competition, the interest of debtholders may impact the structure
of a given market when a firm is more troubled financially. These concerns are
based on tacit collusion among certain debtholders who may have joint control
over the firms in a given industry.
A. Antitrust Tacit Collusion
This section explores the issue of tacit collusion to provide a theory of harm
for common control and present limits under the current doctrine to preclude
such behavior. The Supreme Court has referred to collusion as “the supreme evil
of antitrust.”108 Nevertheless, identifying when an illegal behavior occurs is not
always very clear under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.109

106
See Samuel N. Weinstein, Financial Regulations in the (Receding) Shadow of Antitrust, 91 TEMP. L.
REV. 447, 449–51 (2019); Howard Shelanski, Antitrust and Deregulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1922, 1940–44 (2018);
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 685–86
(2009); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004) (introducing
small additional benefit as grounds for precluding non-conflicting antitrust claims); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA)
LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 278–79 (2007) (expanding plain repugnancy to incorporate conflict between
antitrust and regulation that could arise).
107
See Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773,
1778 (2013); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1930
(2013); George Triantis, Exploring the Limits of Contract Design in Debt Financing, 161. U. PA. L. REV. 2041,
2043 (2013).
108
Verizon Commc’ns, 540 U.S. at 408.
109
See Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
683, 688 (2011) (discussing § 1 of the Sherman Act and the lack of judicial authority lending guidance as to its
application).
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The easiest agreements to prosecute are express agreements with direct
evidence of wrongdoing.110 Where there is such an agreement, antitrust law
condemns such behavior by imposing not only civil penalties but also criminal
penalties resulting in considerable jail time.111 This notwithstanding, much of
the legal difficulty with regard to antitrust law concerns determining (1) if an
anti-competitive action has been done in the absence of an express agreement,
and (2) what factors to consider in determining if an agreement exists that moves
from purely legal tacit collusion to illegal tacit collusion (also referred to as tacit
agreement).112 Thus, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the causal mechanisms
for tacit collusion, beyond mere structural incentives, are difficult to prove for
purposes of establishing antitrust liability.113
This limitation on tacit agreement is longstanding and can be traced as far
back as Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp. in
1954,114 perhaps with antecedents in United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.115 and
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States,116 under
which case law has not made it possible to establish that mere parallel conduct
constitutes an antitrust violation.117
110

See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error,
20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31 (2010).
111
See Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rise and (Potential) Fall of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. 471, 472–73, 475 (2020).
112
See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 114–15 (4th ed. 2017) (“Parallel behavior by competitors might reflect a
conspiracy among them. . . . Of particular importance [are] the specification of the agreeing parties and their
subject matter, conspiratorial motivation, and the critical distinction between agreement in some traditional sense
and mere tacit coordination through recognized interdependence.”); William H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 593, 593–98 (2017).
113
Collusion may not be solely horizontal but perhaps a mix of horizontal and vertical as well. For
example, a firm can get around corporate governance requirements of board approval for a purchase of more
than, say, five percent of ownership of a new company by simply using debt instead of equity. In an ideal world,
this might include debt contracts within the same industry so that the firm can better dictate terms, for example,
to more than one supplier or customer (more hub and spoke collusion that has both horizontal and vertical
elements), or two pure horizontal firms in the same industry to allow for tacit collusion.
114
346 U.S. 537, 537, 540–41 (1954).
115
251 U.S. 417, 440–42 (1920) (“The contentions of the case, therefore, must be judged by the
requirements of the law, not by accidental or adventitious circumstances.”).
116
234 U.S. 600, 608–09, 612–13 (1914) (explaining that to show a conspiracy under the Sherman Act
some agreement must be shown under which the concerted action was taken).
117
Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 50 (“After toying with the possibility of treating oligopolistic
interdependence as a form of agreement, the Supreme Court [ruled in Theatre Enterprises] that proof of
‘conscious parallelism,’ without more, could not . . . establish an antitrust violation.”); Sean P. Sullivan,
Anticompetitive Entrenchment, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (2020). One might argue, as the Areeda &
Hovenkamp antitrust treatise does, that Theater Enterprises did not actually roll back the earlier case law of
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States regarding the meaning of tacit collusion. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
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While several professors suggest ways to improve the reach of antitrust law
to address tacit collusion under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts’ efforts
to create doctrinal coherence in the area have proven to be limited.118 Typically,
therefore, the courts require plus factors to determine antitrust liability for tacit
collusion.119 Due to the lack of clarity as to which plus factors prove tacit
agreement, the law of tacit collusion is at best inconsistent. Overall, it is difficult
to win cases alleging tacit collusion to engage in anti-competitive behavior.
Certainly, courts can make pure tacit collusion illegal without any sort of
communication requirement, as Louis Kaplow suggests.120 Edward Rock and
Daniel Rubinfeld provide an example of the majority view of why mere tacit
collusion should not be the legal standard.121 The concern is one of legal
administrability, given the ambiguous effects of tacit collusion.122 They note that
“it is impracticable to write or enforce an [injunction] enjoining firms not to take
competitors into account when competitors will inevitably respond.”123 Case law

supra note 112, at 210. In Interstate Circuit, the critical fact was the common invitation, which is a form of
private communication. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). Nevertheless, numerous
recent cases suggest the limits of antitrust’s ability to remedy tacit collusion related concerns. See, e.g., Valspar
Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 191–96 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating the rule that conscious
parallelism is “beyond the reach of antitrust laws” and concluding that evidence of “31 parallel price increase
announcements” failed to prove more than the “mere interdependence” of competitors); In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 871–77 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment for defendants on a record
“consistent with tacit as well as express collusion,” in part because “the fewer the firms, the easier it is for them
to engage in ‘follow the leader’ pricing . . . which means coordinating their pricing without an actual agreement
to do so”); Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming a district
court holding that “[cigarette] manufacturers’ pricing behavior evidenced nothing more than ‘conscious
parallelism,’ a perfectly legal phenomenon commonly associated with oligopolistic industries” when appellants
could not produce sufficient evidence tending to exclude the possibility of independent action); In re Graphics
Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1011, 1014–17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding defendants’
participation in thirty industry conferences insufficient); Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Advert. L.P., 57
F.3d 1317, 1319–20 (4th Cir. 1995). This is not to argue that a finding based on mere tacit collusion without
sufficient plus factors is incorrect. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 110, at 30–31, 34–35 (explaining the
possibility of false positives when proving agreement).
118
See Wentong Zheng, A Knowledge Theory of Tacit Agreement, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 399, 401 (2019);
Page, supra note 112, at 621–22 (describing Interstate Circuit as an exemplar of tacit agreement).
119
See William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors and
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 399, 405 (2011).
120
See LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 55–56 (2013). Kaplow’s theory builds
upon Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
See KAPLOW, supra, at xv.
121
See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 21, at 206–07, 209.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 207.
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such as Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly supports such resistance to mere parallel conduct.124
Given how increased concentration may effectively create tacit collusion by
oligopolists, or even legal tacit collusion, one antitrust critique of the growing
concentration in certain industries is that it leads to higher prices.125 From an
enforcement standpoint, what is critical with regard to growing concentration is
that, considering the difficulty of proving the existence of tacit agreement, it has
implications for the design of antitrust enforcement and for addressing potential
anti-competitive activity by debtholders. The more concentrated the industry,
and thus the fewer the firms operating in each market, the easier it is to tacitly
collude.126
Several factors make debt markets more prone to collusive behavior, but
coordination among bondholders by itself does not give rise to a successful
Section 1 claim.127 The following different mechanisms of tacit collusion,
without additional factors, will not lead to a viable Sherman Act Section 1 claim:
(1) multimarket contact, (2) signaling through disclosures, (3) signaling through
bankruptcy filings, (4) “learning by doing,” and (5) executive compensation.
Each is discussed in further detail below.
1. Multimarket Contact
Multimarket contact suggests that the more extensive the overlap across
firms in a market, the larger the benefits of collusion will be.128 The strength of
the multimarket contact across an industry provides a mechanism through which

124
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (“To survive a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present
evidence ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.” (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984))); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007); see also Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 681 (1962) (“‘[I]ndependent’ decision meaning a
decision that would have been taken regardless of what competitors decided to do.”).
125
See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 738 (2018) (“Merger
enforcement is especially important since a wide range of interdependent conduct by oligopolists, i.e., conduct
whereby the oligopolists refrain from vigorous competition, is not considered to be illegal if it does not involve
an agreement among those oligopolists.”).
126
See Miguel A. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion—The Impact of
Communication in Oligopoly Experiments, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1759, 1765 (2012).
127
See United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 918–19 (7th Cir. 2005) (“No wonder that
the second circuit has described as ‘bordering on the frivolous’ a contention that the antitrust laws forbid
creditors to coordinate their positions in bankruptcy.”).
128
See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior, 21
RAND J. ECON. 1, 2–4 (1990).
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firms can make collusion more likely.129 Empirical studies across industries such
as airlines,130 audit firms,131 cement,132 and telecommunications133 found that the
greater the multimarket contact within an industry, the greater the propensity for
tacit collusion. The same mechanism may be at play within certain debt markets.
Across particular industries, there is a set of repeat players among the creditors
involved in lending either to distressed firms or to firms in bankruptcy. A
theoretical study suggested that debt syndication (which is a repeat-player
industry) is another possible mechanism of collusion.134
2. Signaling Through Disclosure
Increased disclosure of information across firms with higher horizontal
shareholding levels makes it easier for firms to coordinate with each other.135
Collusion is usually difficult to maintain because the incentives to cheat may be
strong.136 That is, firms must successfully coordinate their prices and outputs to
collude with each other.137 Disclosure reduces opacity, which makes it easier to
monitor cheating.138 Thomas Bourveau, Guoman She, and Alminas Žaldokas
found that as cartel enforcement picked up in the 1990s, U.S.-listed firms began
sharing more details in their financial disclosures about such business issues as
the names of their customers and their contracts and products.139 This

129

See id.
Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion?
Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND J. ECON. 764, 764–65 (2014).
131
Simon Dekeyser, Ann Gaeremynck, W. Robert Knechel & Marleen Willekens, Multimarket Contact
and Mutual Forbearance in Audit Markets, 59. J. ACCT. RSCH. 1651 (2021).
132
See Ivette Jans & David I. Rosenbaum, Multimarket Contact and Pricing: Evidence from the U.S.
Cement Industry, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 391, 392, 406–07 (1996).
133
Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone Industry, 9
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 287, 294, 296–97 (2000).
134
See John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery & Jordan M. Barry, Collusion in
Markets with Syndication, 128 J. POL. ECON. 3779, 3780–81 (2020).
135
See Andrea Pawliczek & A. Nicole Skinner, Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure 1, 5, 9
(June 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002075); Jihwon Park, Jalal
Sani, Nemit Shroff & Hal White, Disclosure Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership, 67
J. ACCT. & ECON. 387, 391 (2019).
136
See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44 (1964); Edward J. Green &
Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 87
(1984). See generally Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence, in 2
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32 (highlighting that academic
literature has historically “focused on cheating as the most significant challenge to cartels”).
137
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success, 44 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 43, 44–45 (2006) (explaining that cartels restrict output and increase price to maximize profits).
138
Thomas Bourveau, Guoman She & Alminas Žaldokas, Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination
Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations, 58 J. ACCOUNT. RSCH. 295, 296 (2020).
139
Id. at 299.
130
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information exchange created legal tacit collusion through the reduction of
information costs.140 In another empirical study, Gaurab Aryal, Federico
Ciliberto, and Benjamin T. Leyden identified tacit collusion by signaling to
competitors in analyst calls.141
This empirical work on the disclosure of information to stabilize cartels
builds upon earlier insights on how more information about rival firms
strengthens collusion.142 This particularly holds when the same firms interact on
a repeat basis.143 This insight suggests a mechanism for information disclosure
for a subset of debtholder-related information. Specifically, creditors can signal
information about their competitive positions in public documents to their rival
creditors.
These mechanisms may have both pro- and anti-competitive results. In a
recent article, Richard Carrizosa and Stephen Ryan identified two types of
information specified in debt covenants: “(1) projected financial statements for
future periods . . . and (2) more frequent than quarterly (usually monthly) and
not yet publicly available historical financial statements.”144 They found that
debt covenants indeed provide lenders with important information about the
borrowers, which the lenders in turn use for their commercial advantage.145
On the pro-competitive side, such information exchange allows for better
monitoring of debtholders by lenders. This may include greater efficiency in
loan renegotiation and an opportunity to trade on such information.146 On the
anti-competitive side, such mechanisms may allow for better coordination on
price when the lender has interests in more than one firm in the same industry.147

140
Id. at 303; Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto & Benjamin T. Leyden, Coordinated Capacity Reductions
and Public Communication in the Airline Industry 3 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 8115, 2021).
141
See generally Aryal et al., supra note 140 (highlighting that firms may use unverifiable and non-binding
communication to sustain collusion).
142
See Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, Collusion Under Monitoring of Sales, 38 RAND
J. ECON. 314, 315 (2007); Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, Optimal Collusion with Private Information, 32 RAND
J. ECON. 428, 429 (2001); Green & Porter, supra note 136, at 88.
143
See Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma, 64 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 277, 277–78 (2012).
144
Carrizosa & Ryan, supra note 67, at 314.
145
Id. at 336.
146
Id. at 314.
147
Id. This information may create significant hold-up problems that benefit the lender over the borrower.
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3. Signaling Through Bankruptcy Filings
By its nature, bankruptcy requires coordination across firms.148 This is not
to suggest that much of this coordination is anti-competitive; rather, there are
legal means through which firms can potentially tacitly collude that a Sherman
Act Section 1 case may not capture. In turn, if there is a series of industry-wide
bankruptcies, filings in a number of different bankruptcies will help create a
mechanism in which tacit collusion is more likely to be effective.
Because transparency may help solve information asymmetries across firms,
it makes tacit collusion easier to sustain. Thus, for purposes of collusion, the
high costs associated with private communication make the possibility of public
communication increasingly appealing. Public bankruptcy filings help solve a
basic problem with collusion. Court dockets for bankruptcy filings allow
creditors who may have positions in more than one firm in the industry to shift
information from private to public communication, which allows for increased
tacit collusion.149
In two doctrinal areas, the courts have allowed certain behaviors that may
lead to legal tacit collusion in bankruptcy.150 First, Noerr-Pennington
immunity—a doctrine involving coordination to petition the government—
applies in the bankruptcy context.151 Second, courts have recognized that
information sharing has pro-competitive purposes in the bankruptcy antitrust
setting.152 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in United Airlines v. U.S. Bank N.A.
provides one example for both of these settings. Judge Easterbrook explained
the following:
Negotiating discounts on products already sold at competitive prices
is not a form of monopolization. Negotiations on reductions to be taken
in bankruptcy, when the buyer cannot pay all of its debts, are common
and lawful, under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine if nothing else. True,
the Noerr–Pennington doctrine cannot be used to shelter joint activity
148
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 97, 105–07 (1984).
149
See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNILATERAL
DISCLOSURE
OF
INFORMATION
WITH
ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS
(2012),
www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Unilateraldisclosureofinformation2012.pdf (suggesting that there may be proand anti-competitive effects of greater price transparency).
150
See United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 919 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the lessors
did not violate antitrust laws).
151
Id. See generally Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55

RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (2003) (providing an overview and critique of the doctrine).
152

Id.
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that creates monopoly prices independent of any decision by a court or
agency. But collaboration among creditors to formulate a position
about how much of a haircut to accept has no effect unless the court
approves the restructuring.153

More recently, limits to robust antitrust enforcement among funds emerged
when CompuCredit Holdings Corporation sued twenty-one hedge funds.154
These hedge funds collectively held seventy percent of the bonds that
CompuCredit had issued five years earlier.155 CompuCredit unsuccessfully
alleged that these hedge funds had been part of a conspiracy to refuse accepting
a tender offer that CompuCredit made to repurchase these bonds.156 The
analytical reasoning behind the decision was rudimentary, but the allegations
suggest a mechanism through which bondholders may be able to collude with
each other.157
4. Learning by Doing
Knowledge within and across firms may develop through “learning by
doing,” which is experiential learning within the firm.158 If effectively exploited,
learning by doing can improve firm outcomes.159 Collusion may also function
within a learning-by-doing framework, with the collusive outcomes of similar
product patterns being easier to sustain than those of newer products.160

153
154

Id. (citations omitted).
CompuCredit Holdings Corp. v. Akanthos Capital Mgt., LLC, 661 F.3d 1312, 1313–14 (11th Cir.

2011).
155

Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1312.
157
Within debt, perhaps a better example than bonds is private debt. Bonds by nature are of course
typically tradeable, and bond covenants are much looser because of collective action costs. In contrast, private
debt exerts a much tighter leash on borrowers because of the relatively small size of lending syndicates as
compared to bond offerings, which may involve hundreds of dispersed bondholders. Private bank loans involve
tight covenants, direct contracting, and regular monitoring.
158
See LINDA ARGOTE, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: CREATING, RETAINING AND TRANSFERRING
KNOWLEDGE 197–99 (1999); Roger D. Blair, Christine S. Wilson, D. Daniel Sokol, Keith Klovers & Jeremy A.
Sandford, Analyzing Vertical Mergers: Accounting for the Unilateral Effects Tradeoff and Thinking Holistically
About Efficiencies, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 761, 776–77 (2020).
159
See Blair et al., supra note 158, at 777 (citing William Mitchell, J. Myles Shaver & Bernard Yeung,
Foreign Entrant Survival and Foreign Market Share: Canadian Companies’ Experience in United States
Medical Sector Markets, 15 STRAT. MGMT. J. 555, 565 (1994)).
160
Danial Asmat, Collusion Along the Learning Curve: Theory and Evidence from the Semiconductor
Industry 1 (Econ. Analysis Group, Working Paper No. 16-4, 2019) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/collusion-along-learning-curve-theory-and-evidence-semiconductor-industry)
(hypothesizing that collusion is more effective in older product generations than newer ones).
156
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Debt covenant terms are oftentimes similar in their language.161 The value
of increased uniformity in contracts is that a similar template reduces the
transaction costs.162 Such contracts also reduce litigation costs because certain
contractual terms have greater legal certainty.163
Homogenous contracts, with repeat players among the lenders and the law
firms drafting the agreements, may provide various signals across lenders with
regard to the nature of control that each lender may have for a debt contract.
There is extensive literature suggesting that many debt contracts are based on
boilerplate language.164 Similarly, many terms tend to get used time and time
again by the same creditor or underwriter.165 This product homogenization
makes it easier for lenders to tacitly collude with each other, where they may
jointly exercise control over the production function of more than one firm in
the same industry over time within a learning-by-doing framework.166 Much of
the contracting is done with private ordering. Relational contracting among
regular industry players makes the debt community a relatively small and tight
community of repeat players.167
5. Executive Compensation
Executive compensation may be a mechanism of reinforcing collusion.168 A
recent study suggests that executive compensation and the use of executive
compensation consultants within the same product market can make tacit
161
See Gus De Franco, Florin P. Vasvari, Dushyantkumar Vyas & Regina Wittenberg-Moerman,
Similarity in the Restrictiveness of Bond Covenants, 29 EURO. ACCT. REV. 665, 665 (2020).
162
See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 884–
85 (2006); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 437–38 (2002).
163
See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or
the “Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 722 (1997); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market
Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 52 (2013).
164
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 163 at 715; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82
TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
165
See De Franco et al., supra note 161, at 671–72.
166
See George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 13, 15 (1974); Stigler, supra note 136.
167
See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate
Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 652 (2009); Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice
Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 713, 716 (1991). Lawyers representing
these firms, by extension, also tend to be repeat players and may lead to information leakage and collusion across
lenders or borrowers.
168
See Antón et al., supra note 50, at 2–3. But see Erik P. Gilje, Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levitt, Paying
Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 154
(2020) (“[O]wnership overlap is a necessary but insufficient condition for shifting managerial incentives.”).
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collusion more likely.169 That is, the use of relative performance benchmarking
of firms within the same industry seems to make tacit collusion more likely.170
The same study also found that tacit agreement through the use of equity
contracts for executives could extend the time horizon of potential cartel
members.171 Even if debtholders do not formally control the firms, they may use
incentive-based contracts for the executives they will place within the firms.172
Calibrating the compensation scheme for executives within the same industry to
the same level may encourage increased coordination through tacit collusion.173
B. The Particular Roles of Hedge Funds, Private Equity Firms, and
Distressed Debt Lenders in Collusion
The strategy of hedge funds in corporate governance has received increasing
academic attention.174 Hedge funds can be divided into two different types: those
that use debt and those that do not.175 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock explain
the following:
Unlike traditional investors, activist hedge funds look for bonds where
companies have violated, have arguably violated, or are about to
violate some contractual provisions; buy up a large quantity of the
issue; and then aggressively enforce their rights. Hedge funds have
been able to greatly ameliorate the historic underenforcement problem
because they have the sophistication to detect potential violations, the
financial resources to acquire substantial amounts of a single bond
issue, and the willingness to take on issuers; perhaps most importantly,
they have decided to pursue, and become experienced in pursuing, this
strategy.176

169
See Sangeun Ha, Fangyuan Ma & Alminas Žaldokas, Motivating Collusion 1–2 (HKUST Bus. Sch.
Ctr.
for
Econ.
Pol’y,
Working
Paper
No.
2021-08,
2021)
(available
at
https://cep.hkust.edu.hk/sites/cep.prod01.ust.hk/files/publications_media/full_paper/WP%202021-08_0.pdf).
170
See id. at 10.
171
Id. at 19–20.
172
Cf. id. at 10 (suggesting the role that performance benchmarking can make in motivating collusion).
173
Id. at 15–16.
174
See generally Colleen Honigsberg, Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the
Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules, 57 J. ACCT. RSCH. 845, 848 (2019) (contributing to the academic
literature by explaining inconsistencies and focusing on the effects of the disclosure rules); Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021,
1026 (2007) (adding to the modern academic literature about hedge fund activism).
175
For a more nuanced discussion of hedge fund leverage, see generally Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy &
Gregory B. van Inwegen, Hedge Fund Leverage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 102 (2011).
176
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 283 (2009).
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In the common ownership literature, there is a concern that index funds are
likely to be more pro-management than side with activist investors.177 On the
debt side, however, common control works in the opposite direction: debt is an
instrument often used by hedge funds and other funds that want to reshape the
board.
The lack of transparency in debt markets makes the possible severity of the
common debt and collusion problem difficult to quantify. Private investors often
conceal their identities and the investment strategies that they employ.178 Such
investors may also behave strategically.179
Coordinated behavior across hedge funds is already a part of corporate
governance. John Coffee and Darius Palia explain the following:
[A] leading cause of increased hedge fund activism appears to be the
development of a new activist tactic: namely, the formation of the
hedge fund “wolf pack” that can take collective (or, at least, parallel)
action without legally forming a “group” for purposes of the federal
securities laws (which would trigger an earlier disclosure
obligation).180

One aspect of the “wolf pack” is that its membership is not known. That is,
unless there is an affirmative declaration of the group members, they will not be
known unless they meet the SEC reporting threshold of five percent.181 As there
is a small number of repeat players and limited relational contracting matter,
there may be legal tacit collusion signals akin to a “wolf pack” between the
partial controllers of debt funds.
The case that best identifies how hedge funds may use tacit collusion to
change corporate governance and the business strategy of a particular firm is
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht.182 However, the mechanism at play in this case
also suggests a more general antitrust angle with regard to bondholder
communication across firms in the same industry.

177
See Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, The Common Ownership Hypothesis:
Theory and Evidence 1, 3 (Econ. Stud. at Brookings, Working Paper, 2019) (available at https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ES_20190205_Common ownership.pdf).
178
See Jonathan Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1615 (2009).
179
See id. at 1617.
180
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 550 (2016).
181
Id. at 562.
182
C.A. Nos. 9469, 9497, 9508, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
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In Third Point, the hedge fund Third Point LLC made it known publicly that
it was purchasing shares of Sotheby’s stock through its filings with the SEC.183
In its amended Schedule 13D filing, Third Point indicated that it had increased
its stake in Sotheby’s to 9.4% and that it would seek changes in management
and the board.184 Consequently, Sotheby’s board adopted a rights plan and a
trigger of 10% ownership for Schedule 13D filers and 20% for all other
shareholders (Schedule 13G filers).185 Then Third Point amended its Schedule
13D to note an increase in its ownership stake closer to the 10% trigger of the
rights plan.186 It also announced in its amended filing that it intended to nominate
three directors.187
After it commenced a formal proxy fight, Third Point requested that
Sotheby’s waive the 10% cap so that Third Point would acquire an ownership
stake in Sotheby’s of up to 20% of the common stock.188 The Sotheby’s board
rejected Third Point’s request after they assessed that Third Point was likely to
win the proxy contest if it acquired an additional 10% of the common stock of
Sotheby’s.189
While the case before the Chancery Court revolved around whether the
threat was cognizable under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,190 for
purposes of this Article, the critical fact is that a very low ownership stake can
exercise an outsized voice in corporate governance because it can signal to the
other activist shareholders to operate jointly in a proxy contest.
The opinion explained the mechanism by which signals through filings
would alert other activists about how to tacitly coordinate as to strategy. The
court illustrated this by describing a meeting of the board and its advisors:
[T]he Board was informed that stockholder activism levels were
“high,” at least in part because of activists’ prior successes in waging
proxy contests. The presentation also contained a slide titled “Activist
Investor Tactics Typically Follow a Familiar Pattern.” According to
the presentation, this pattern usually consists of activists building a
stake in an entity, individually or by teaming up with other institutional

183

Id. at *3.
Id. at *9.
185
Id. at *10.
186
Id. at *12.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at *12–14.
190
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (holding that when a board addresses a pending takeover, it has an
obligation to protect the best interests of the corporation and the shareholders).
184
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or activist stockholders to form a “wolf pack,” applying pressure on
the entity, including threatening to agitate against a board’s preferred
strategic alternatives, and finally taking action against the board by
threatening “withhold the vote” campaigns, demanding board seats,
launching a short-slate proxy contest, or making aggressive use of
derivatives.191

Thus, even with a small share of equity, Third Point could signal to other
activists and consequently transform the very business strategy of Sotheby’s.
An empirical study showed that corporate disclosure could allow for
increased collusion among firms.192 Public disclosure serves as a mechanism for
firms to relay information to each other, which reduces the information
asymmetries across firms and lowers the monitoring costs.193 This in turn may
facilitate tacit collusion.194 The collusive mechanism for debt-based collusion
may be bankruptcy filings or press releases.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Modification of Antitrust Merger Law
As it is difficult to prove tacit agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, a more effective mechanism of addressing debt control collusion is through
the merger process under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7 is a more
effective mechanism for four main reasons. First, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
is superior to Section 1 of the Sherman Act with respect to establishing liability.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not condemn conscious parallelism, but
conscious parallelism can have all the negative consequences of explicit price
collusion.195 In contrast, Section 7 of the Clayton Act can condemn a transaction
that increases the likelihood of conscious parallelism even though such
parallelism does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.196 Thus Section 7 of
the Clayton Act can prevent anti-competitive conduct that Section 1 of the
Sherman Act does not address. Second, Section 7 of the Clayton Act is superior
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act Section with respect to remedies. Section 7 of

191

Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029 at *1, *5 (emphasis added).
Bourveau et al., supra note 138.
193
Andrea Pawliczek, A. Nicole Skinner & Sarah L. C. Zechman, Facilitating Tacit Collusion: A New
Perspective on Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure 1–2 (May 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382324).
194
Id.
195
See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
196
See id. § 18.
192
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the Clayton Act is geared toward enjoining or undoing transactions while
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is less so.197 Third, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
is superior to Section 1 of the Sherman Act with respect to identifying
problematic transactions. Merger law already has a reporting requirement.
Although the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act does not currently reach debt
transactions (except convertible debt when there is conversion into equity), it
can be easily modified to include such transactions, or at least more easily than
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which has no similar established reporting
mechanism.198 Fourth and finally, the nature of the problem is typically not one
of hub and spoke under Section 1 of the Sherman Act involving vertical firm
issues for which other types of antitrust collusion solutions may work.199 Rather,
debt-based collusion is about financing, which affects the firm’s budget
constraints rather than its production function.
The basic premise regarding using Section 7 of the Clayton Act to limit the
coordinated effects is that the fewer the number of firms in a given market, the
easier it is to collude.200 This theoretical insight has made its way into the dicta
of a number of cases.201 The Heinz case warns about the dangers of coordinated
effects,202 but most of the merger challenges brought in the courts focus on
unilateral effects.203 Thus, including debt-based merger control also has the
benefit of reinvigorating coordinated effects analysis.
To understand why a reformulated version of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
can be an effective remedy against debt collusion, it is important to understand
the current limits of merger law. The HSR Act fundamentally transformed
197
But Section 1 does have an advantage because its treble damages remedy provides for deterrence (and
disgorgement).
198
See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
199
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 238 (1986).
200
Green et al., supra note 52, at 465 (describing the economics of tacit collusion). Of course, the number
of firms is but one factor to consider. Other factors include ease of entry, excess capacity, size and cost
asymmetries, multi-market contact, buyer power, demand shocks, demand uncertainty, price transparency, and
ease of communication.
201
See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 n.24 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Significant market
concentration makes it easier for firms in the market to collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price
above or farther above the competitive level.”); see also Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th
Cir. 1986) (“The fewer competitors there are in a market, the easier it is for them to coordinate their pricing
without committing detectable violations of [S]ection 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids price fixing.”).
202
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The combination of a concentrated market
and barriers to entry is a recipe for price coordination.”).
203
See Andrew R. Dick, Merger Policy Twenty-Five Years Later: Unilateral Effects Move to the
Forefront, 27 ANTITRUST 25, 25 (2012); Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral
Effects?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 34 (2003).
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merger review under the Clayton Act.204 It created an administrative mechanism
for the antitrust agencies to pre-clear or challenge mergers prior to their
consummation.205
At the time of the HSR Act’s drafting, the acquisition of debt was not seen
as problematic and therefore did not require notification. As such, it was exempt
from HSR reporting requirements.206 What worked in the 1970s, however, needs
revising in the modern era. The most obvious change is that the use of debt has
been significantly transformed since the passage of the HSR Act.207 Indeed, the
world of debt at the time of the enactment of the HSR Act bears little
resemblance to today’s world of sophisticated debt governance.208
Further, academic knowledge across economics, finance, and law regarding
the use of debt as a control mechanism has become more refined, transforming
scholarship. Yet, prior studies that focused on creditor opportunism had not
addressed partial control and the antitrust implications.209 The theory behind
these concerns regarding merger law should also apply to debt.
The current U.S. antitrust system suffers from a form-over-substance
problem, as it treats control differently depending on whether it is based on
equity or on debt. This is ironic because the bases for merger enforcement and
204
See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST
L.J. 865, 865 (1997) (“[T]he premerger notification provisions of the HSR Act have been . . . the most important
factor in the replacement of merger control through litigation with a comprehensive scheme of merger
regulation.”); William Blumenthal, Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger Enforcement, 65 ANTITRUST L.J.
813, 813 (1997).
205
See Blumenthal, supra note 204, at 814.
206
See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c).
207
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity’s Governance Advantage: A Requiem, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1095,
1099 (2019).
208
See Johnathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 84 S. CAL.
L. REV., 1035, 1038–39 (2011); Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market,
and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 671–72 (2009) (detailing changes to debt).
209
For a further discussion of the various issues that the existing creditor opportunism has addressed, see
generally Lipson, supra note 208; Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131
(1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Bndholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1821 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207 (1991); William W.
Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (2018); Edith S. Hotchkiss, Kose
John, Robert M. Mooradian & Karin S. Thorburn, Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in 2
HANDBOOK CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 253 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008) (“The
general conclusion from much of this literature is that absent holdout problems and other coordination problems,
private debt restructurings such as exchange offers provide a lower cost restructuring mechanism than formal
bankruptcy.”); Michelle Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors’
Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 84–87 (2008).
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antitrust law are more generally the economic effects of a merger. Yet, existing
merger case law provides economic analysis that can be applied to similar debtbased issues of control. Antitrust law already identifies situations in which low
levels of equity-based control may create competitive concerns. Where there has
been enforcement, the rationale for enforcement has been based on economic
effects that are subject to fact-specific inquiries. No stock ownership, rather than
low stock ownership, can create competition problems based on control—a
concept that it not difficult to digest.210
For an investor to avail themselves of the passive-investor exemption, they
must satisfy two criteria under the HSR Act. First, the acquisition of stock must
be made solely for investment purposes (i.e., passive investment).211 Second, the
stock acquired in the transaction must not be used to lessen—or attempt to
lessen—the competition substantially.212 The Supreme Court, in a case
preceding the HSR Act, identified that investors can run afoul of the rule even
if the investment is passive if the second criterion is not met.213 Since the
enactment of the HSR Act, these two criteria have been narrowly construed by
courts and the antitrust agencies when ownership led to influence in business
decisions.214 The antitrust agencies have articulated that an investment
exemption means an investor has “no intention of participating in the
formulation, determination, or direction of the basic business decisions of the
issuer.”215
Most debt-related deals would not trigger activity suggesting influence or
control. Two relatively recent investor exemption cases brought by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division involving stock suggest the type
of situations in which debt might have an analogous trigger regarding
influence.216 The first case involves Third Point’s investment in Yahoo.217 Third
Point’s actions that suggested influence included (1) inquiring about the interest
of the candidates in the CEO board positions, (2) assembling an alternate slate
of board-of-director candidates, (3) drafting correspondence to Yahoo indicating

210

Lipson, supra note 208, at 1082.
See 15 U.S.C. § 18(c)(9).
212
See id. § 18.
213
See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597–98 (1957).
214
Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy–And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix
It, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207, 263 (2020).
215
16 C.F.R. § 801.1(i)(1) (2018). For a more detailed analysis, see generally Kara Kuritz & Matthew
Wheatley, An Antitrust Roadmap for Private Equity Investment, 34 ANTITRUST 70 (2020).
216
United States v. Third Point Offshore Fund, Ltd., No. 1:15-cv-01366 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015); United
States v. VA Partners I, LLC, No. 3:16-cv-01672 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2016).
217
Third Point Offshore Fund, No. 1:15-cv-01366.
211
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that Third Point candidates were prepared to join the board, (4) undertaking
internal deliberations regarding a proxy battle, and (5) making public statements
about a potential slate of directors.218 The second case involves ValueAct.219 The
DOJ Antitrust Division sued ValueAct, alleging the firm sought to influence
Halliburton and Baker Hughes in their merger regarding deal terms and deal
strategy.220 These cases show that even with a small number of shares, it is
possible for investors to exercise control.221 If control is measured by economic
effect, these same control dynamics should apply in the case of debt-based
control.
B. Use of Corporate Law to Help Explain Control for Antitrust Purposes
Delaware corporate law often recognizes that the economic substance of
control trumps the form of governance.222 Take three areas of governance as
examples: (1) standing for derivative suits, (2) the determination of control, and
(3) the determination of the ultimate fiduciary. Background legal rules also
provide bargaining for ex ante legal contracting in bond contracts, which can
shape debt governance.223
Who controls the corporation for purposes of fiduciary duties is largely
contextual rather than based on who owns the majority of shares. One of the
best-known cases involving the entire fairness doctrine is Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Systems, Inc.224 In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that a minority shareholder, Alcatel, was a controlling shareholder even
though it owned only 43.3% of the shares and appointed only a minority of the
board members. Since Kahn, courts have examined whether a shareholder
“actually control[s] the board’s decisions about the challenged transaction.”225
The Delaware courts have held that the amount of stock necessary to be
controlling can be as low as a 17.3% stake.226
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Id. at 6.
VA Partners I, No. 3:16-cv-01672.
220
See Complaint at 2, VA Partners I, No. 3:16-cv-01672.
221
See id.
222
In some areas, Delaware law prefers substance over form. Different merger structures have different
treatment with regard to shareholder voting. Similarly, the doctrine of independent legal significance provides
that one section of law is legally independent of other unrelated sections.
223
See Badawi, supra note 65, at 3, 7–8.
224
638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
225
In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8541, 2014 WL 5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch. 2014).
226
See In re Zhongpin Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7393, 2014 WL 6735457, at *8 (Del. Ch. 2014), rev’d, In
re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015).
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Delaware law also examines substance over form in determining the ultimate
fiduciary. For example, in In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation,227 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the directors of the corporate general partner of a
limited partnership owe a fiduciary duty directly to the limited partnership.228
Similarly, in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Salisbury, Maryland v. Handy,229
the court carried out a fact-specific inquiry of veil piercing (and conduct prior to
forming an LLC) to establish the liability of the residual owners of the LLC.
Hence, it is possible to address issues of substance over form in a business law
context.
C. Other Legal Systems that Offer Some Guidance on a More Robust
Inclusion of Debt-Based Control
A number of other legal regimes have addressed debt-based control in
antitrust matters. These regimes show it is possible to formulate functional legal
rules that do not create significant administrative costs for a more robust antitrust
enforcement of debt-based control.
1. Japan
In Japan, there is a five percent notification threshold for ownership both in
the Antimonopoly Act and the Banking Act with regard to debt.230 Both
restrictions limit the bank’s control on the acquired firm.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) merger guidelines explicitly
mention “financial relationship” as a factor for deciding whether a firm is in a
“joint relationship” with another firm.231 If the acquiring firm is neither the top
shareholder nor owns more than twenty percent of a target’s shares, the JFTC
examines a number of factors to decide whether the acquiring firm and the
acquired firm are in a “joint relationship.” The JFTC presumes that if the two

227

600 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. Ch. 1991).
This is longstanding under Delaware corporate law. See S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 491–92
(1919) (holding that the parent shareholder of the company that is the controlling shareholder of the downstream
corporation owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the downstream corporation).
229
No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000).
230
Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No. 54, Apr. 14,
1947) (Japan).
231
JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES TO APPLICATION OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT CONCERNING
REVIEW OF BUSINESS COMBINATION 4 (2019), https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines_
files/110713.2.pdf.
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firms are in a “joint relationship,” then they will operate their businesses in a
unified way, whether fully or partially.232
2. European Commission
The European Commission (EC) approach of “decisive influence” is not
lowered or altered depending on the transaction form and should capture when
a creditor acquires influence over a distressed or bankrupt target. The closest
policy gets to debt-based control is the consolidated jurisdictional notice, which
gives the EC the right to look into debt instruments.233 There are a few court
cases that address the impact of debt between close competitors and mix both
debt and equity with regard to the issues of control, but those cases address debt
that constrains the ability of a firm to spend to improve its competitive
position.234
3. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom competition regime recognizes low levels of
ownership, and no ownership may raise competition concerns. Competition
concerns arise when there is “material influence” at less than twenty-five percent
shareholdings, and in exceptional cases, less than ten to fifteen percent.235 This
is largely a fact-specific inquiry.236 There has been at least one case where a
party used debt to have another firm front its investment in a competitor.237 The
rules around material influence are probably flexible enough to involve
situations of pure debt.

232
Id. at 2–3; see, e.g., JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE PROPOSED
MERGER BETWEEN NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION & SUMIMOTO METAL INDUSTRIES, LIMITED 4 (2011),
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2011/dec/individual-000457_files/2011_Dec_14.pdf (showing
the presumption of a joint relationship can be rebutted).
233
See Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice Under Council Regulation 139/2004, 2008 O.J. (C
95) 1, 8 (“Furthermore, control can also be established by any other means. Purely economic relationships may
play a decisive role for the acquisition of control. In exceptional circumstances, a situation of economic
dependence may lead to control on a de facto basis where for example long term supply agreements or credits
provided by suppliers or customers, coupled with structural links, confer decisive influence.”).
234
See OFF. J. EUR. CMTYS., COMMISSION DECISION, 93/252/EEC art. 2, No. L 116, 21 (Nov. 10, 1992).
235
Competition & Markets Authority, Mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s Jurisdiction and Procedure,
GOV.UK,
¶ 4.27
(Dec.
23,
2020)
[hereinafter
CMA,
Mergers:
Guidance],
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/384055/CMA2__Mergers__Guidance.pdf.
236
See id.
237
See The Merger Situation (Stora/Swedish Match/Gillette) (Interim Provision) Order 1991, SI 1991/750,
art. 1, ¶ 3 (Eng.).
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Addressing this concern, the Competition Market Authority’s merger
guidance refers to lender control.238 The guidance explains that board
representation alone (without shareholding) can be sufficient for material
influence. Further, the debt control hypothesis was flagged in a 2018
government white paper on reforms to national security,239 which noted “there
may be exceptional instances where loans or conditional acquisitions (like
futures options) give rise to national security risks.”240
CONCLUSION
Overall, antitrust policymakers must do a better job of incorporating decades
of theoretical and empirical financial economics and the economics of debtbased control into their policies. While not all debt-related transactions have
created competitive concerns, a subset of such transactions may do so. At
present, neither Section 7 of the Clayton Act nor Section 1 of the Sherman Act
provide a mechanism to address these issues. Reforms to merger law offer the
easiest and most effective way to address such problematic situations. Such a
reformulation can mimic how other jurisdictions identified that this sort of
collusive activity warrants review. Particularly during a period of economic
tumult, in which debt transactions may increase, antitrust thinking needs such
an urgent change.
To better understand the specifics of how debt-based collusion and control
work, empirical studies should foster a better understanding of the industries in
which much commonly owned debt is seen. Debt control collusion may be
higher when an industry’s characteristics and past experiences with bankruptcy
lead to the expectation that the state of the world is more likely to affect the
industry more than other industries, but empirical evidence will better explain
when such predictions hold up. The use of textual analysis for machine learning

238
CMA, Mergers: Guidance, supra note 235, ¶ 4.36 (“Financial arrangements may in certain
circumstances confer material influence where the conditions are such that one party becomes so dependent on
the other that the latter gains material influence over the company’s commercial policy (for example, where a
lender could threaten to withdraw loan facilities if a particular policy is not pursued, or where the loan conditions
confer on the lender an ability to exercise rights over and above those necessary to protect its investment, say,
by options to take control of the company or veto rights over certain strategic decisions).”); see also OFF. OF
FAIR TRADING, COMPLETED ACQUISITION BY FIRST MILK LIMITED OF A 15 PER CENT STAKE IN ROBERT
WISEMAN DAIRIES PLC, 2005, at 2 (UK) (providing similar insight).
239
See SEC’Y STATE FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY & INVESTMENT: A
CONSULTATION ON PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS (2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/728310/20180723_-_National_security_and_
investment_-_final_version_for_printing__1_.pdf.
240
See id. at 30.
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also offers possibilities to better understand these dynamics through review of
securities filings, press releases, analyst calls, debt covenants, and other forms
of communication in which tacit collusion may occur.241
Better empirics will allow potential plaintiffs to identify the circumstances
under which creditors have incentives to collude and (working back) the
circumstances under which creditors have incentives to accumulate debt across
firms in the same industry. Such an understanding will have implications on the
industry conditions. Specifically, it would alter the likelihood of debt becoming
more valuable due to the advantage of cross-company control to be used for anticompetitive purposes. This differs from a mere understanding among
debtholders that they are all similarly situated and should behave when firms are
under distress or in a state of bankruptcy.
Other jurisdictions are more attuned to the potential risk of debt control as a
competition issue. To the extent that debt control is a competition problem, the
circumstances in which such a problem may manifest via tacit collusion are
limited. However, under such circumstances, antitrust law in the United States
faces an enforcement gap, which may lessen competition and hurt consumers.
The most effective way to address these concerns is to reformulate the HSR rules
to add debt-based control as a factor that may produce an anti-competitive effect.
Such an outcome recognizes the economic-based spirit of the existing HSR rules
and applies that spirit to a different type of transaction—one that has the same
effect of influencing business decision-making and substantially lessening
competition.

241
For recent work on textual analysis and machine learning, see generally Jonathan Clarke, Hailiang
Chen, Ding Du & Yu Jeffrey Hu, Fake News, Investor Attention, and Market Reaction, 32 INFO. SYS. RSCH. 35
(2020) (demonstrating that one can identify fake news from linguistic features of article); Tarek A. Hassan,
Stephan Hollander, Laurence van Lent & Ahmed Tahoun, Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects,
134 Q.J. ECON. 2135 (2019) (showing tools from computational linguistics can be used to measure political
risks); David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational Analysis of Constitutional
Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2019) (using text-analysis techniques to investigate constitutional
discourse outside courts).

